Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts

Sunday, September 25, 2011

Thoughts on Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit

The following paragraphs contain a few thoughts or insights that came to mind reading Hegel's Phenomenology.  They do not necessarily reflect an accurate interpretation of Hegel's own thought, but rather the summary of what I was able to glean from it.  His book was difficult, and I may learn more from another reading, but for now this is what I learned from it.  

The “I”, as subject, is devoid of those personal characteristics associated with self-identity, the reflexive self, or self-as-object, the “me”.  Hegel concludes that the “I” is universal – by contrast, I conclude that the act of subjectivity is deeper than our reflexive ego, and prior to it.  Our subjectivity is transitive from us to something transpersonal and prior to even our pre-biographical unity or transcendental apperception.  The pre-biographical unity is the unity anterior to the self, while the “universality” of subjectivity points to a unity anterior to subjectivity as such.  The act of subjectivity is an act “pushing forward” from the impersonality of pure subjectivity to the reflexivity of self-awareness on through to the multiplicity of sense objects, upon which we turn back to a second reflexive understanding of the self (the first was self-consciousness, this is a truly reflexive understanding of oneself) as we process our sense-impressions through our thoughts and self-concepts.

Riding this wave of the surging act of subjectivity backwards (a paradox, since to think about something is to objectify it, and we are objectifying subjectivity qua subjectivity), we find that the pure subjectivity qua subjectivity is not only devoid of personal characteristics, but it is a surging-forth from nothingness into being.  This surging-forth, phenomenologically constituted, is the apperception of itself, that is, as the subjectivity surges forth into the cognition of things and thoughts, it apperceives the very act of apperception, and likewise there are reflective acts on a deeper level than apperception that turn back on themselves, pushing back the envelope deeper and deeper all the way to a nothingness prior to the unity of being.

This surging-forth from nothingness is the act of Creation, in theological terms, since the acts of creation and sustaining the universe are one.  The unity of this one act can be seen in the lack of individuality or the “universality” of the subjectivity qua subjectivity – though it is reflected on by many “me”s, there can be no multiplicity to the subjectivity as such, because no characteristics by which to individuate it.  There is only one “surging-forth” – one act of creation.

This is not metaphysical idealism, because we must alienate the objectivity of the outside world from our own subjectivity by positing objects separate from us, and the necessity of such an alienation implies a noumenal “surging-forth” independent of the existence of a human subject understanding or perceiving the objects.   This noumen is prime matter; it does not exist except phenomenally, but to even talk about a noumen is to talk about it as phenomenon, so it is meaningless to say that the noumen is “unknowable”.

Let us ride the wave of being forward now.  God reveals Himself by creating and by sustaining the world, and His Providence is the same as his sustaining of the world, and Hegel notes how man through his intellectual activity orders the world, imparts finality to it, elucidates it, sheds light on diversity in order bring unity and order out of chaos.  The movement is toward consciousness, consciousness OF everything in its relation to everything else.  Hegel thought this was the Absolute struggling to achieve consciousness of itself; I say it is God revealing Himself through the Book of Nature.

Saturday, September 24, 2011

That the material cause of evil is a bad sense of humor, with an illustration from Chesterton

Incongruity is the essence of humor; contradiction is the essence of evil.  The formal cause of evil is the contingent being rejecting its contingency.  It is humorous to joke about wanting to kill your mother-in-law; it is evil to actually do so.  Rudeness and insults are quite often funny when intended as a joke/teasing, but become mean when taken seriously. The incongruity of sex in certain situations forms the material for dirty jokes; yet to take such seriously is called fornication.  (Likewise, to take sexual pleasure from such jokes of a sexual nature – and not just that pleasure of incongruity – is fornication of the heart.)

To take an example, Sunday in G. K. Chesterton’s The Man Who Was Thursday is an “anarchist” leader, yet in an entirely playful manner.  It is Gregory who takes it seriously, and who is the evil one.

Saturday, August 6, 2011

Aristotle's Proof of the Necessity of Friendship

Aristotle gives an extended argument that friendship is necessary for happiness in his Nicomachean Ethics,
1170a14-b19.  Since some of the pro-syllogisms are only implied, one Professor Burnet wrote out the argument in explicit syllogism form.  Here I present a similar analysis by Sir David Ross, which he credits to Burnet but with minor variations.  Credit goes to Ross' translation of the Ethica, in a footnote to pages 241-243:

Pro-Syllogism A:
Capacity is defined by reference to activity.
Human life is defined by the capacity of perception or thought.
Therefore, human life is defined by the activity of perception or thought.

Pro-Syllogism B:
The determinate is good by nature.
Life is determinate.
Therefore, life is good by nature.

Pro-Syllogism C (implied):
What is good by nature is good and pleasant for the good man.
Life is good by nature (conclusion of pro-syllogism B).
Therefore, life is good and pleasant for the good man.

Pro-Syllogism D (implied):
Life is good and pleasant for the good man (conclusion of C).
Perception and thought are life (conclusion of A).
Therefore, perception and thought are good and pleasant for the good man.

Pro-Syllogism E:
What is desired by all men and particularly by the good and supremely happy man is good in itself.
Life is so desired.
Therefore, life is good in itself.

Lemma:
Perception and thought are accompanied by consciousness of themselves.

Argument F:
Perception and thought are life (conclusion of A).
Therefore consciousness of perception and thought is consciousness of life.

Argument G:
Consciousness of having something good is pleasant.
Life is good in itself (conclusion of both B and E).
Therefore, consciousness of life is pleasant.

Argument H (implied):
Consciousness of life is pleasant (conclusion of G).
Consciousness of perception and thought is consciousness of life (conclusion of F).
Therefore, consciousness of perception and thought is pleasant.

Lemma:
The existence of the good man is specially desirable because the activities of which he is conscious are good.

Argument I:
The good man is related to his friend as he is to himself (conclusion of chapter 4 from the Ethica, previously).
His own existence is desirable to him (conclusion of C).
Therefore, that of his friend is desirable to him.

Argument K:
His own existence is desirable because of his consciousness of his good activities (a premise drawn from a previous statement in the Ethica).
Therefore, consciousness of his friend's good activities is also desirable to him.

Argument L:
If a man is to be happy, he must have all that is desirable to him.
Friends are desirable for a man (conclusion of I).
Therefore, if a man is to be happy, he must have friends.

There seem to be two weak chains in the argument, though I do not dispute the conclusion.  The first weak chain seems to be the minor premise of A, that the capacity for perception or thought is what defines human life (note that both terms here are distributed, so the chain of syllogisms is logically valid).  Though this goes into proving a conclusion I would not want to deny - the conclusion of D - it seems a simplistic reduction of the richness of human life to reduce it to thinking, especially the way the term is used in E (is the activity of perception and thinking desired by all men?).  The second weak chain is the minor premise of argument L, that if a man is to be happy, he must have all that is desirable for him.  There are many things desirable for me.  I will not have all of them in my life, nor do I expect to.

I'd chalk this up to a good demonstration of the effort that goes into proving philosophical conclusions (twelve syllogisms), and to the imperfection often inherent in philosophical reasoning for uncontroversial conclusions.